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His argument relies on a number of examples of how natural selection works on traits, personally i dont think these examples hold up, because i dont think he takes account of inter-species (or 'arms-race') competition, or indeed a very comprehensive range of different possible selectional pressures at all. But ill have to do some more work and read the paper though a few more times before i comment much more. [[User:Orgone|Orgone]] 14:58, 19 January 2007 (UTC) |
His argument relies on a number of examples of how natural selection works on traits, personally i dont think these examples hold up, because i dont think he takes account of inter-species (or 'arms-race') competition, or indeed a very comprehensive range of different possible selectional pressures at all. But ill have to do some more work and read the paper though a few more times before i comment much more. [[User:Orgone|Orgone]] 14:58, 19 January 2007 (UTC) |
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| + | :Heres a good review of the book in which the paper was published, paragraph 5 onwards for a discussion of Cummins in particular: http://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=1355 [[User:Orgone|Orgone]] 16:32, 19 January 2007 (UTC) |
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Revision as of 16:32, 19 January 2007
Ev-Psych: Dependent on bad teleological explanations?
Neo-Teleology
- Robert Cummins
- University of California, Davis
- rcummins@ucdavis.edu
Abstract:
"Neo-teleology is the two part thesis that, e.g., (i) we have hearts because of what hearts are for: Hearts are for blood circulation, not the production of a pulse, so hearts are there (animals have them) because their function is to circulate the blood, and (ii) that (i) is explained by natural selection: traits spread through populations because of their functions. This paper attacks this popular doctrine. The presence of a biological trait or structure is not explained by appeal to its function. To suppose otherwise is to trivialize natural selection."
Full paper here: (https://netfiles.uiuc.edu/rcummins/www/HomePage/Papers/NeoTeleology.pdf)
This is an interesting paper which i am looking at as part of my own paper on evolutionary psychology, because im concerned about the impact it's conclusions have on the validity of the type of explanations ev-psych commonly offers for the existence of evolved psychological mechanisms. Orgone 03:02, 18 January 2007 (UTC)
- Am I off the mark here to suggest that Cummins' description of Neo-teleology sounds a bit like ultimate causation, and his description of functional analysis sounds a bit like proximal causation? Jason Bessey - Jaywin (talk) 16:29, 18 January 2007 (UTC)
No i dont think your off the mark at all:
"Proximate explanations focus on how a phenomenon works (what controls the phenomenon, as it is now seen). How are sonar clicks produced by bats? How is their ear modified to perceive and use these signals? These are proximate questions.
- Goal is to understand mechanisms. How does trait work?
Ultimate explanations focus on why a trait exists, rather than one of other plausible alternatives. Why do bats have sonar? Does it help them catch food, avoid predators, or both? These are ultimate questions.
- Goal is to understand evolution. Why does trait exist?"
(http://www.montana.edu/~wwwbi/staff/creel/bio405/405lec5.pdf)
So, if i have read his paper correctly, according to Cummins the proximate "How does trait work?" explanation should be the only one, he would call it the "Functional Analysis". Cummins is making some subtle methodological arguments as he difines his terms, but mainly he is saying that you cannot isolate a certain mechanism and ask "Why is it there?" (its adaptive-selectional history) by appealing to "How does it work?" (its function), or vice versa presumably, he argues that these two properties are sufficiently distinct in the way they operate to make such appeals to neo-teleological (ultimate causal) explanations invalid or misleading. He argues that teleological-type explanations have been removed "root and branch" from every other field of science, true enough, and that natural selection does not provide the "grounding-process" it is presumed to in order to keep them in biological/psychological theory. A thorough functional analysis, he argues, will provide a better understanding of evolution anyway.
His argument relies on a number of examples of how natural selection works on traits, personally i dont think these examples hold up, because i dont think he takes account of inter-species (or 'arms-race') competition, or indeed a very comprehensive range of different possible selectional pressures at all. But ill have to do some more work and read the paper though a few more times before i comment much more. Orgone 14:58, 19 January 2007 (UTC)
- Heres a good review of the book in which the paper was published, paragraph 5 onwards for a discussion of Cummins in particular: http://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=1355 Orgone 16:32, 19 January 2007 (UTC)